ment of its hopes,

and the calamities incident to unsuccessful

War.'" -I

Courts have no policy and can exercise

no political powers. They can only declare

tne law. un wnat sound principle, then,

can we say judicially 1 that the levying of

war ceases to be treason wnen the war be­

comes formidable ? that war levied by ten

men or ten hundred, is certainly treason,

but is no longer such when levied by ten

thousand or ten hundred thousand ? that

the armed attempts of a few. attended bv

no serious danger to the Union and sup­

pressed by slight exertions of the public

force, come, unquestionably, within the

constitutional definition, but attempts by a

vast combination, controlling several States,

putting great armies in the field, menacing

with imminent peril the very life Of the

ivepuouo ana aemanaea immense enorts

ana immense expenditures of treasure and

blood for. their defeat and suppression,

swell beyond the boundaries of tho defini­

tion, and become innocent in the propor­

tion of their enormity ?

But it is slid that this is the doctrine of

the Supreme Court. We think otherwise.

In modern times it is the usual practice

of civilized governments attacked by or­

ganized and formidable rebellion, to exer­

cise and concede belligerent rights. In­

stead, under such circumstances, of pun­

ishing rebels when made prisoners in war

as criminals, they agree on cartels for ex

change and make other mutually.beneficial

arrangements ; and, instead of insisting

upon ouensivo terms ana aesignations in

intercourse with the civil or military chiefs,

treat tnem, as lar as possible, without sur

render, of essential principles, like foreign

ioe eugageain regular wariare.,

But these are concessions made bv the

Legislative and Executive departments of

government in the exercise of political dis­

cretion and in the interest of humanity, to

mitigate vindictive passions inflamed bv

civil conflicts, and prevent the frightful

evils of mutual reprisals and retaliations.

'lney establish no rights except during the

war. v.

And it is true that when war ceases and

the authority of the regular government is

folly re-established the penalties of violated

law are seldom inflicted upon many.

Wise governments never forget that the

criminality of individuals is not always or

often equal to that of the acts committed

by the organization with which they are

oonnected. Many are carried into rebel

lion by sincere though mistaken convic­

tions ; or hurried along by excitements due

to social and State sympathies, and even

by the compulsion of a public opinion not

their own. -

When the strife of arms is over, such

governments, therefore, exercising still

their political discretion, address themselves

mainly to the work of conciliation and res

toration, and exert the prerogative of mer

cy, rather than that of justice. Complete

remission is usually extended to large class­

es by amnesty or other exercise of legisla­

tive or executive authority, and individu-

included in these classes with some ex

ceptions oi tne greatest offenders, are atn

solved by pardon, either absolutely dr

- -1 i i .1

upon conuiuous prescriDea Dy tne govern­

ment These principles, common to all civilized

nations, are those which regulated the ac

tion oi the Uovernment or the United

States during the war of the rebellion and

have regulated its action since rebellion

laid down its arms. . , ...

In some respects the forbearance and lib

erality of the nation exceeded all example.

While hostilities were yet flagrant one act

of Congress practically abolished the death

penalty for treason subsequently committed

and another provided a mode in which cit

izens of rebel States maintaining a loval

adhesion to the Union, could recover after

war, the value of their captured or aban

doned property. '

'Xhe .National Uovernment has steadily

sought to facilitate restoration with ade

quate guaranties of union, order and eaual

rights. . . ; -

Un no occasion, however, and by no act

have the United States ever renounced

their constitutional jurisdiction over the

whole territory over the citizens of the Re

public, or conceded to citizens in arms

against their country the character of alien

enemies, or admitted the existence of any

government da facto, within the bounda­

ries of the Union, hostile to itself. -

In the Prize Cases the Supreme Court

simply asserted the right of the United

States to treat the insurgents as belliger­

ents, and to claim from foreign nations the

performance of neutral duties under the

penalties known to international law. The

decision recognized, also, the fact of the

exercise and concession of belligerent rights

ana amrmea, as a necessary consequence,

iub prupotuuon ui&b aunng me war, ail tne

inhabitants of the country controlled by the

rebellion, and all the inhabitants of the

country loyal to the Union were enemies

reciprocally each of the other. But there

is nothing in that opinion which gives

countenance to tne doctrine which counsel

endeavor to deduce from it ; that the in­

surgent States by the act of rebellion and

by levying war against the nation became

foreign States, and their inhabitants alien

enemies.

This turoposition beintr denied, it must

result that in compelling debtors to pay to

receivers, for the support of the rebellion,

debts due to any citizen of the United

States, the insurgent authorities commit­

ted illegal violence, by which no obligation

of debtors to creditors could be cancelled,

or, in any respect, affected.

nur can me aeience in mis case aerive

more support from the decisions affirming

the validity of confiscations during the war

for American Independence.

That war began, doubtless, like the re­

cent civil war, in rebellion. Had it termi­

nated unsuccessfully, and had English Tri­

bunals subsequentlv affirmed tha vaJiditv f

colonial confiscation and sequestration of

joniisu property ana aebts due to British

subjects, those decisions would ba i n nnint

No student of international law or of his­

tory needs to be informed how impossible

it m mat oaca uecisions coma nave been

made. ' . ; ' . ::, :i

Had the recent rebellion proved suacem.

fal, and had the validity of the confisca­

tions and sequestrations actually enforced

by' the insurgent authorities been after

wards questioned in Confederate Courts, it

is not improbable that the decisions of the

State Courts, made during and after the re­

volutionary war. miit tava beea cited

WILMINGTON. N. C.,

But it hardly needs remark, that those

decisions were made under circumstances

widely differing from those which now exist.

They were made bv tha Courta of States

whichhad succeeded in their attempt to

sever tneir colonial connexion with Great

Britain, and sanctioned acts which depend

ed for their validity wholly upon that sue

cess; and can have no application to acts of

a rebel self styled government, seeking the

severance oi constitutional relations oi

States to the Union, but defeated in the

attempt, and, itself, broken up and de

stroyed. ;

, Those who engage in rebellion must con

aider the consequences. If they succeed.

rebellion becomes revolution ; and the new

government will justify its founders. If

they fail, all their acts hostile to the right

ful government, are violations of law, and

originate no rights which can be recognized

by the Uourts of the .Nation whose author­

ity and existence have been alike assailed

i We hold, therefore, that compulsory pav.

ment, under the Sequestration acts, to the

rebel receiver, of the debt due to the plain­

tiffs from the defendant, was no discharge.

It is claimed, however, that whatever

may be the right of the plaintiff's to re

cover tne principal debt from the defend­

ant, they cannot recover interest for the

time during which war prevented all com­

munication between the States in which

thev respectively resided. ;

We cannot think so. Interest is the law­

ful fruit of principal. There are, indeed.

some authorities to the point that interest

i jt j , a

"tutu uim uucraeu u tiring war ueiweeu in­

dependent nations, cannot be afterwards

recovered ; though the debt with other in

terest may be. But that rule, m our judg

ment, is applicable only to such wars. We

perceive nothing in the act of the 13th

July, 1861, which suspended for a time all

pacifio intercourse between the legal and

insurgent portion of the country, that re­

quires or justifies the application of that

rule to the case before us. Legal rights

could neither be originated nor defeated by

the action of the central authorities of the

late rebellion.

The plaintiff must have iudement for

the principal interest of his debt, without

aeauction. ..

THE